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The paper investigates the incentive effects of performance-vested stock options (PVSOs) in 
aligning management interests with shareholder wealth. Performance targets attached to 
option vesting would prevent executives from receiving rewards from outcomes that are 
unaffected by their effort. Such targets align executive pay more closely with shareholder 
wealth. The degree of interest alignment is measured by pay-performance sensitivity (PPS). 
Using data on 4,238 executive-level observations for 1,383 executive directors in the largest 
244 UK non-financial firms from 1999 to 2004, we find that the presence of PVSO schemes 
in executive-compensation contracts is associated with higher PPS, consistent with the idea 
that stronger incentives are provided by PVSOs. The empirical evidence also shows that 
PVSOs outperform unconditional stock options (TSOs) in providing incentives, since higher 
PPS is associated with the presence of PVSOs. Moreover, the results testify the role of 
vesting-target difficulty of PVSOs in the pay-performance relation. Specifically, difficult 
targets are associated with lower PPS levels, implying that too difficult targets negatively 
affect managers’ choice of effort, that relatively lower effort is to be expected, and that the 
interests of managers will diverge from the interests of shareholders. 
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In the wake of the corporate scandals from the beginning of this decade, increasing 
concerns have been raised regarding various aspects of corporate governance (DeFond, Hann 
and Hu 2005). As an important component of corporate governance reforms, managerial 
compensation, especially equity compensation (stocks and stock options), has come under 
scrutiny. The vesting of traditional stock options (hereafter TSOs) is simply contingent upon 
the passage of time. Opponents of TSOs criticize the inadequate link between managers’ pay 
and improvement of firm performance (Gerakos et al. 2005). For example, when the market 
as a whole rises, managers are generously rewarded even if they underperform the market 
average or their peers. Accordingly, activist shareholders have proposed that firms attach 
company-specific performance targets to equity compensation, and condition option vesting 
on the achievement of performance targets. These proposals have been rapidly implemented. 
As reported by Mercer Human Resource Consulting, 30 out of 100 major US corporations 
based a portion of the equity granted to their executives on performance targets in 2005, up 
from 17 in 2003, and 23 in 2004. 
Although the claim is that vesting performance targets provides better incentives, the 
implications of such an awards mechanism on managerial behavior remain undocumented 
(Bruce and Buck 2005). Some theoretical studies show that performance-vested stock options 
(hereafter PVSOs) provide managers with greater incentives than their traditional counterparts 
have to behave in line with shareholder interests (Johnson and Tian 2000; Kuang and Suijs 
2006). Yet, evidence also documents the undesirable consequences of such a compensation 
instrument. Risk-averse managers with undiversified portfolios have the incentive to 
influence their own compensation and self-serve in order to maximize their interests (Bertrand   3
and Mullainathan 2001; Hall and Murphy 2002). Basing payments or promotion opportunities 
of managers on the achievement of performance targets reduces the incentive effects of the 
compensation, and even induces managerial game-playing at the expense of shareholders 
(Healy 1985; Gaver et al. 1995; Jensen 2003). Camara and Henderson (2005) show that 
managers have incentives to manage earnings when PVSOs are granted. They provide 
analytical evidence that managers benefit from earnings manipulation, which increases the 
costs that the shareholders have to bear. Meanwhile, the consensus from the goal-setting 
literature promotes the idea that “challenging” targets are associated with improvements in 
firm performance (Merchant and Manzoni 1989; Locke and Latham 2002; Hansen et al. 2003; 
Jensen et al. 2004). Highly achievable targets, however, are also vulnerable to managerial 
manipulation, and the effectiveness of limiting managers’ gains for moderate or poor 
performance is questioned (Conyon and Murphy 2000). 
The debate on the incentive effects of PVSOs is also conducted in the practitioners’ 
arena. In its Global Best Practice 2006 for “Corporate Performance Management”, PWC 
advocates that firms attach performance targets to stock option compensation. In contrast, 
some high profile corporations urge shareholders to reject the proposal of PVSOs. They 
believe that attaching performance targets to stock options puts the company at a competitive 
disadvantage, in the sense that those performance hurdles constrain the company’s ability to 
recruit and retain top talent.
1 Meanwhile, some executive compensation critics challenge the 
incentive effects of PVSOs. They allege that firms merely grant PVSOs in order to placate 
investors who are calling for compensation reforms, and that the symbolically adopted 
PVSOs with easily achievable performance targets will not provide additional incentives 
(Gerakos et al. 2005). 
This study empirically examines the incentive effects of attaching performance targets 
to option vesting by testing the relation between PVSO compensation and pay-performance 
                                                        
1 “Activists  sink  claws  into executives’ pay”, Wall Street Journal, February 27, 2006.   4
sensitivity (PPS), a measure of interest alignment between owners and managers (Jensen and 
Murphy 1990; Garen 1994; Aggarwal and Samwick 1999; Conyon et al. 2000b). We attempt 
to answer two research questions: first, is PVSO compensation associated with greater interest 
alignment between managers and shareholders, and second, what is the role of vesting-target 
difficulty in this relationship? The study focuses on the UK because listed firms in the UK 
disclose more detailed information on managerial compensation compared to firms in the US, 
an advantage that helps our investigation. Based on a dataset of 4,238 individual-level 
observations from 1,383 executive directors in the largest 244 UK non-financial firms from 
1999 to 2004, we find that the presence of PVSO schemes in managerial compensation 
contracts is associated with a higher level of pay-performance sensitivity compared with the 
case where PVSOs are absent, which suggests a better alignment of owner and manager 
interests through the use of PVSOs. Furthermore, PVSOs exhibit a higher level of PPS 
relative to their traditional counterparts (TSOs). In addition, we find that target difficulty 
influences pay-performance sensitivity in the sense that stricter performance targets cause 
lower interest alignment. 
The contribution of this paper to the compensation literature is threefold. First, we are 
among the first to investigate empirically the incentive effects of PVSOs. Despite the 
popularity of PVSOs in contemporary compensation packages, the extent to which this 
incentive instrument is effective remains an open question. Second, we make a 
methodological contribution in the sense that we adopt multilevel modeling, which allows us 
to address the fact that some executives are more alike than others (i.e., within one firm), and 
to show that observations are not completely independent in the full sample. Finally, we are 
the first to study the issue of target difficulty in stock option compensation and to measure 
vesting-target difficulty with multiple measurements. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We review the institutional 
background in Section 2 and develop the hypotheses in Section 3, followed by a description   5
of our methods and sample selection procedure in Section 4. Data sources are presented in 
Section 5. We discuss the empirical findings in Section 6. Section 7 presents the results of 
sensitivity tests. The paper concludes with a summary and discussion in Section 8. 
 
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
UK managerial pay level and its association with firm performance are subjects that 
generate heated debates among government regulators, capital markets, and academia. Since 
the ‘80s, the rapidly increasing managerial compensation in leading companies (largely due to 
the growing popularity of stock and stock options as incentive devices) has drawn intensive 
scrutiny from many commentators (Conyon and Murphy 2000). It has become a topical policy 
issue to consider how managerial compensation should be crafted so as to provide incentives 
for higher managerial effort. One of the major concerns pertains to the incentive effects of 
TSOs. The vesting of TSOs is, in general, contingent only upon the passage of time. 
Opponents argue that managerial benefits might merely mirror be a reflection of the price 
increases in a rising market. Managers will in such cases receive windfall gains, even if they 
under-perform relative to the market average or to their peers. These concerns were voiced in 
influential corporate governance codes, issued by the Cadbury- (1992), Greenbury- (1995), 
and Hampel- (1998) committees, which describe the general framework of management 
compensation. Substantial changes were witnessed afterwards. For example, all listed firms 
must now include an audited report on executive remuneration in their annual reports, stating 
clearly their compensation policy for top managers and describing fully the remuneration 
packages of executive and non-executive directors.
2  A remuneration committee chaired by an 
independent director is responsible for setting the remuneration packages for the CEO and the 
other directors. At annual general meetings (AGMs), shareholders vote on executive 
                                                        
2  The information on executive remuneration disclosed in UK annual reports is currently more detailed than under 
US disclosure regulations (“How the UK checks CEO pay”, Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2006).   6
compensation packages. Although it is not mandatory to do so, companies often adhere to the 
outcomes of these votes (Conyon, Core and Guay 2006). Many reforms also took place on 
managerial compensation, the most prominent of which was to introduce performance hurdles 
into executive equity compensation, such as stock options. In the post-reform period, the 
majority of stock option exercises are conditional on the achievement of predetermined 
performance targets. In other words, without clearing these hurdles, managers cannot exercise 
the options, no matter how long they have held them. 
Performance targets attached to option vesting are designed to reward managers for 
performance delivered. The most widely adopted target is the growth rate of earnings per 
share (EPS) (Conyon et al. 2000a). In its remuneration report of 2004, Allied Domecq 
describes its executives’ Share Option Scheme as follows: 
“…Options are normally exercisable after the third anniversary of the date of the grant 
and lapse ten years after the date of their original grant, subject to a performance condition 
based on earnings per share growth. Options become exercisable if company’s growth in 
normalized earnings per share exceeds the growth in the UK retail prices index by 9% over 
three years following the grant of options.” 
The second most frequently used performance condition is total shareholder return 
(TSR).
3  When this measure is applied, option vesting usually depends on the market return of 
a firm relative to the performance of a peer group. The 2004 annual report of Cable & 
Wireless states the following: 
                                                        
3  The choice of performance targets might be due to the distinction in accounting treatment between market-based 
performance targets (e.g., achieving a specified share price or a specified target based on a comparison of the 
entity’s share price with an index of share prices of other entities) and non-market performance targets (e.g., 
revenues or profits). IFRS 2 states that the accounting for share-based payments depends on whether the 
performance condition is market-based, non-market based, or both. More specially, non-market-based performance 
features should not be included in the determination of the fair value of the share-based payments at the grant date. 
“True-up” adjustments are made at interim reporting dates, and only the options that vest are ultimately expensed. 
However, market-based performance conditions should be taken into account when estimating the fair value of the 
equity instrument granted, and thus there is no opportunity for true-up adjusting after option grants. When both 
performance features are applied to option grants, Paragraph 21 states that the grant date fair value of the 
share-based payment of a firm with market-based performance conditions that has met all its other vesting 
conditions should be recognized, irrespective of whether that market condition is achieved. But if all vesting 
conditions are met except the non-market-based performance condition, nil expense will be charged.   7
“…The vesting of share options awarded to the Executive Directors is subject to 
relative TSR performance conditions. Full vesting occurs only if the TSR performance of the 
Company meets or exceeds the upper quartile (of FTSE 100) on the third anniversary of the 
date of grant. Where TSR performance meets the median, 50 percent of the initial award vests. 
A sliding scale operates between median and upper quartile, and nothing vests for TSR 
performance below the median.” 
In response to the above-mentioned corporate governance codes, some investors and 
top managers in the UK have doubts about the proposed changes in the compensation system; 
they believe that firms suffer a brain drain of top talent when performance targets are attached 
to option vesting, especially in view of the lack of US-sized pay packages
4. In spite of this 
opposition, the recommendations in the corporate governance codes still meet with 
widespread approval and implementation. In 1997, among the largest 200 UK firms, almost 
60% of the operating stock option compensation plans for CEOs were based on performance 
criteria (Conyon et al. 2000a). In our sample, 54% of the firms that adopted stock option plans 
in their top manager compensation contracts attached performance targets to these stock 
options in 1999, and this proportion increased to 94% in 2004.
5 
 
3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
This section develops our hypotheses regarding the functioning of performance-vested 
stock options (PVSOs) in aligning shareholder value and management interests. We use the 
pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) to measure the interest alignment between shareholders 
                                                        
4  “How UK checks CEO pay”, Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2006. 
5  In the US, pension funds and other activist shareholders have been calling for a reform of TSO plans (Gerakos et 
al. 2005). Since the beginning of this decade, several high profile companies, from ConAgra Foods Inc. to Peoples 
Energy Corp., have started to put performance hurdles in stock and stock option compensations. In 2005, 30 out of 
100 major US corporations based a portion of the equity granted to their CEOs on performance targets. Some 
commentators predict that half the nation’s big companies will use such awards by the end of 2006 (“US boards tie 
CEO pay to results”, Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2006). A variety of performance goals are employed as 
option vesting constraints in US firms, some of which are based on financial performance (i.e., earnings or revenue 
growth rate), while others link option exercise price to a market index or a certain price target. Under US 
regulations, however, firms are not required to disclose numerical goals, because it may give firms “a competitive 
disadvantage” (William Nuti, NCR Corp. CEO/President/Director).   8
and managers. PPS measures how managerial compensation changes with firm performance 
and shareholder wealth (Jensen and Murphy 1990; Garen 1994; Hall and Liebman 1998; 
Aggarwal and Samwick 1999). 
All of the hypotheses are anchored in principal-agent theory. The first focuses on how 
PPS may differ between firms that grant PVSOs to their top managers and those without such 
equity compensation. The second hypothesis compares the functioning of PVSOs and TSOs 
to obtain interest alignment. Finally, the third hypothesis explores the role of target difficulty. 
 
3.1 Compensating managers with PVSOs vs. without PVSOs 
PVSOs can be considered as a compensation instrument with ingredients (i.e. target 
incentive and equity incentive) that stem from contingent pay, such as cash bonuses, and stock 
options, respectively. We argue the incentive effects of PVSOs from the two aspects as 
follows. 
From a target-incentive perspective, performance targets induce higher managerial 
effort: managerial effort is private information to managers and not observable to 
shareholders. This creates a moral hazard problem, and observable performance is employed 
as an indicator of managerial effort. Managers are compensated based on improvements in 
observable performance (Holmstrom 1979; Grossman and Hart 1983; Christensen and 
Demski 2003). Suppose that managerial compensation consists of two elements: fixed salary 
and contingent pay based on observed performance. Thus, when performance targets are 
included in the contingent pay, managers receive only their base salary if they miss the 
predetermined targets.
6 Since observable performance is more likely to exceed the targets 
with high levels of effort, performance targets increase the incentive to exert high effort. 
PVSOs are options with vesting conditional upon achieving predetermined targets. 
                                                        
6 When the effort choice of managers significantly influences firm risk, convexity will be added to the optimal 
compensation contracts (Hemmer et al. 1999; Feltham and Wu 2001; Lambert and Larcker 2001; Core et al. 2003).   9
Such target arrangement would motivate managers to choose high effort, because this 
increases the probability of achieving targets and benefiting from the options. In addition, 
managerial effort may enhance the magnitude of managerial gains from stock options. Stock 
option compensation directly ties managers' gains to market prices. If the market appreciates 
the managerial effort, the perceived effort will be translated into a market price increase. In 
sum, managerial effort stimulated by vesting targets increases managerial payoff. 
Performance targets are desirable from the shareholders' perspective because induced 
higher managerial effort promotes shareholder value. Since both managerial payments and 
shareholder wealth increase with managerial effort, performance targets stimulate high 
managerial effort and consequently closely align the interests of managers and shareholders
7. 
Therefore, higher PPS arises in the presence of PVSOs, given that other factors (e.g. 
managerial risk aversion and firm risk) remain constant. 
From an equity-incentive perspective, PVSOs reduce the interest conflict between 
shareholders and managers. Agency theorists argue compellingly that when the wealth of 
managers is not tied directly to firm value by stock ownership, managers may lack incentives 
to exert the level of effort desired by the shareholders, or may consume perquisites at the 
expense of the firm (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Stein 2001; Baldenius 2003; Bebchuk and 
Fried 2003). By granting stock options, shareholders share a value increase of the firm with 
the managers. As equity holders, managers have a claim to the firm's residual value. It is in 
the interest of both shareholders and managers to increase the firm's net profit and its market 
value. Prior studies have documented that with the increase of managerial ownership 
managers are less likely to undertake short-term myopic activities and are more likely to make 
decisions benefiting the firm in the long term, which coincides with shareholder interests 
                                                        
7 Social-cognitive theory yields a similar prediction. As a member of the boardroom, managers usually play an 
active role in the goal setting process (Grinstein and Hirbar 2003; Buck et al. 2003). High levels of involvement 
build up managers’ confidence in attaining the targets. Social-cognitive theory predicts that people with high 
self-confidence tend to set higher goals than those with low self-confidence and high self-confidence leads to 
performance improvements (Locke et al. 1990; Seijts et al. 2001).   10
(Warfield et al. 1995).
8 
Taken together, the above suggests a better interest congruence associated with 
performance-vested stock options, which can be demonstrated by a higher PPS level. Our first 
hypothesis is thus as follows: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, the presence of performance-vested stock options in managerial 
compensation packages is associated with a higher level of pay-performance sensitivity. 
 
3.2 Compensating managers with PVSOs vs. with TSOs 
With traditional stock options, the payoff of managers depends solely on the difference 
between market prices at exercise date and exercise prices as determined on the grant day. 
Market prices are thus used implicitly as a performance measure. Nevertheless, market prices 
do not necessarily mirror managerial effort. For example, in a bull market, managers receive 
windfall gains from exercising stock options, even when they under-perform the market 
(Gerakos et al. 2005). Moreover, if they stay long enough, managers may weather bad periods 
and ultimately get option-related value, even if shareholder wealth is not promoted. 
The Informativeness Principal (Holmstrom 1979) suggests that such noise in evaluating 
managerial effort constrains the provision of incentives. One remedy commonly 
recommended is to employ relative performance evaluation (RPE). In contrast to rewarding 
managers solely on their own performance, RPE compensates managers according to how 
well they perform relative to the market or their peers. Performance targets attached to PVSOs 
are usually related to market or peer group performance, and PVSOs are therefore a form of 
RPE. Indeed, firms condition stock option vesting on performance criteria that measure 
managerial performance relative to the whole economy or a group of comparable firms.
9 For 
                                                        
8  Overwhelming managerial ownership may result in entrenchment problem (Claessens et al. 2002; Lennox 2005). 
In such cases, managers have incentives to pursue their own interests without increasing firm value. 
9  This is consistent with the recommendation of the Greenbury code (1995) that managers should not be rewarded 
for increases in market prices or other indicators that reflect general price inflation, general movements in share 
prices or movements in the share prices of an entire market or industry.   11
instance, in the UK, performance targets attached to stock options are generally classified into 
accounting-based and market-based targets. When accounting-based targets are applied, 
improvements are often required with respect to growth in earnings per share (EPS) in excess 
of inflation (e.g. 3% EPS growth annually above the retail prices index). When market-based 
targets are employed, option vesting usually depends on the firm’s market return relative to a 
peer group, and only above-group-median performance is rewarded (Greenbury 1995). 
Rewarding managers on the basis of how well they do relative to the macroeconomic 
circumstances and/or competitors in the same industry reduces the noise and thus increases 
precision in inferring the unobservable effort of managers. Theoretical studies have 
demonstrated that incentive effects, as measured by the pay-performance relationship, are 
negatively (positively) related with the noise (precision) in performance measures (Baker 
2000). PVSOs impose relative performance evaluation on stock option compensation. As a 
result, the reduction of the noise in performance measures increases the level of 
pay-performance sensitivity. Our second hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the pay-performance relationship is higher for performance-vested 
stock options relative to traditional stock options. 
 
3.3 Target difficulty in PVSOs 
In an agency setting, Kuang and Suijs (2006) find that PVSOs induce higher 
managerial effort when performance targets are below a certain threshold, indicating that 
performance targets that are too difficult negatively impact managerial effort choices. ‘Too 
difficult targets’ in general are interpreted as those beyond managers’ limit of ability (Latham 
and Locke 2002). In other words, even when managers exert high effort, there is little 
probability of reaching a too-difficult target, and then the expected benefits from displaying 
this effort are below a manager’s personal cost of doing so. In such a case, maximizing   12
expected utility implies that a manager will not choose a high level of effort.
10 
Prior studies are consistent with the negative impact of too difficult targets on 
managerial behavior
11. A consensus in the goal-setting literature is that performance benefits 
are associated with challenging but attainable performance targets, while firm performance 
decreases when the targets are set beyond managers’ ability (Locke et al. 1988; Merchant and 
Manzoni 1989; Hirst and Lowy 1990; Covaleski et al. 2003; Hansen et al. 2003; Jensen et al. 
2004). The budgeting literature indicates the common existence of upward ratcheting in 
managers’ budgetary targets. Concern about missing performance budgets gives 
high-performing managers the incentive to reduce their reported performance in order to 
avoid the increase in current performance budgets (Leone and Rock 2002; Indjejikian and 
Nanda 2002). Empirical evidence on performance bonuses also shows that confronted with 
unattainable bonus targets, managers are less than well motivated. Lower firm performance is 
correlated with too-difficult targets, suggesting that managers stop exerting higher effort and 
even save potential performance for future benefits, such as “taking a bath” (Healy 1985; 
Gaver et al. 1995; Holthausen et al. 1995; Jensen 2003). 
Our third hypothesis focuses on the effects of using difficult vesting targets on 
pay-for-performance sensitivity. Confronted with difficult targets, managers exert lower effort. 
Firm performance is thus more likely to decrease. We predict that relative to moderate 
performance targets, difficult targets result in a lower level of interest congruence between 
managers and shareholders; a lower pay-for-performance sensitivity will consequently be 
observed. Our third hypothesis: 
H3: Ceteris paribus, difficult performance targets are related with a lower PPS level. 
                                                        
10 Our economic reasoning is consistent with theories of motivation in the psychological literature. Expectancy 
theory (Vroom 1964) states that human behavior is motivated by valence (anticipated satisfaction), instrumentality 
(the belief that performance is rewarded) and expectancy (the belief that effort will lead to the rewarded 
performance). Since difficult goals reduce people’s expectancy of goal success, lower performance is predicted.   
11 An inverted U-shaped relationship between performance and target difficulty has been documented in 
goal-setting literature (see Latham and Locke 2002 for a review). We test the existence of such relationship 
between PPS and target difficulty in the robustness check section.   13
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
This section quantifies the extent to which management pay is sensitive to corporate 
performance, and the effect of the presence of PVSOs on PPS. In an attempt to address some 
of the concerns with prior PPS modeling methodologies, we introduce the multilevel 
modeling method. 
 
4.1  Measuring compensation and firm performance 
Prior PPS studies on the UK only use salary and bonuses to measure executive 
compensation. By excluding equity-based components of executive overall remuneration, the 
estimated relationship between compensation and performance may be biased, as the 
incentive effect of one component of the compensation package depends on how the other 
components are concurrently adjusted (Lambert et al. 1991; Kole 1997). Moreover, with the 
increasing popularity of incentive-based executive pay, non-cash elements of pay are now 
often larger than their cash counterpart (Conyon and Murphy 2000). We thus employ two 
measures of executive pay: 
1.  Total Compensation (TotComp): salary, bonus, pension, other cash compensation 
(e.g. relocation and fringe benefits), and changes in unrealized value of stocks of 
executive wealth
12. 
2.  Total Wealth (TotWealth): cash compensation plus estimated value of stock options 
and shareholdings (as employed in Jensen and Murphy 1990)
13. 
Both accounting-based (e.g. earnings per share or return on equity) and market-based 
(shareholder return or shareholder wealth) measures have been employed in prior empirical 
                                                        
12 In other words, we use the summation of changes in the Black-Scholes value of stock options, changes in the 
value of stocks of executives’ equity, and changes in estimated value of restricted stocks, as the executive 
compensation measure used in Buck et al. 2003. 
13  TotComp literally depicts the ‘flow’ part in the sense that it measures the total executive rewards during a period 
(i.e. one year) while the ‘stock’ element of executive pay is represented by TotWealth.   14
models to measure firm performance (Jensen and Murphy 1990; Garen 1994; Aggarwal and 
Samwick 1999; Conyon et al. 2000b). However, since the principal-agent model emphasizes 
the convergence of owner- and management interests, a market-based measure reflecting 
share-price appreciation and dividend yield (i.e. total shareholder return) seems more intuitive 




4.2 Measuring the presence of PVSO and TSO, and vesting target difficulty   
A dummy variable (PVSO) is coded to equal one for the presence of PVSOs in a 
manager’s compensation contract, and is zero otherwise. Similarly, a dummy variable (TSO) 
is constructed to indicate the presence of TSO. Regarding the performance targets attached to 
option vesting, three measures are used to capture target difficulty: absolute target difficulty 
(ABSDIF), relative target difficulty (RELDIF) and ex-post difficulty (DIFF). As mentioned in 
Section 2, performance targets attached to PVSOs generally take two forms: earnings per 
share (EPS) growth rate over the index of retail prices, or total shareholder returns (TSR) 
relative to firm-specific peer groups. Only the former vesting targets are comparable among 
sample firms, since the benchmark (here the index of retail prices) is common to all firms. In 
contrast, when peer groups are used, each firm might select a distinct benchmark group with 
which to compare the TSR performance. Thus, all three measures are based on EPS figures. 
ABSDIF is the stated EPS target itself. RELDIF measures the distance of EPS target in excess 
of the industry median. This relative measurement enables a comparison among sample firms 
from different industries. DIFF is an ex-post measurement, which is coded one for missing 
predetermined targets, and zero for achieving the targets. Each manager has a different 
perception of target difficulty, and it is not feasible for a large sample study to investigate the 
perceived target difficulty at the executive level. To the extent that ex-post  performance 
                                                        
14  We nevertheless conduct robustness tests with accounting-based performance measures.   15
results can reflect manager’s ex-ante perception of target difficulty, this proxy is valid. 
Following firms’ vesting requirements (Camera and Herderson 2005), the target difficulty 
proxies are constructed on a three-year rolling average basis
15. Table 1 defines the variables. 
Accurately capturing managers’ perception of target difficulty is a controversial topic 
(Locke and Latham 2002). Nevertheless we intend to provide a complete picture of target 
difficulty perception and thus measure target difficulty from multiple angles (i.e. ex ante 
incentives vs. ex post realization; absolute difficulty measure vs. relative difficulty measure). 
We also admit the possible deficiency of our target difficulty measurements. 
 
4.3 Empirical Models 
Prior studies show that PPS is jointly determined by both firm-level factors (e.g. firm 
size, beta, the uncertainty about firm value) and CEO-individual factors (including age, risk 
aversion and personal cost related with exerting effort) (Garen 1994). PPS studies need to 
control for two-level factors. Empirical models are usually estimated on the individual 
executive level (Hall and Liebman 1998; Aggarwal and Samwick 1999; Buck et al. 2003). 
While they include firm-level variables (such as firm size, industry sector), these factors are 
only a subset of the proxies that should be taken into account. Thus, without fully controlling 
for the entire set of variables that may influence pay-performance sensitivity, this 
methodology runs the risk of correlated omitted variables, which may bias the results. 
Meanwhile, in prior studies, the model of interest is usually estimated using first-order 
differencing. One important econometric feature of this modeling procedure is that first-order 
differencing estimation mitigates any potential bias in the estimation of coefficients due to 
time-invariant fixed effects. But the model specification may still be problematic if the 
                                                        
15  For instance, in 1999, Firm A grants PVSOs with EPS performance target of annual growth 2% above the retail 
price index growth rate; in 2000, the EPS target for PVSOs newly granted increases to 3% over the inflation 
growth; and in 2001, the performance target for new PVSO grants remains the same. Then, the annual EPS growth 
rate calculated on a three-year rolling basis is 2.67% [i.e. (2%+3%+3%)/3] above the retail price index growth rate.   16
variables that are omitted vary over time, such as factors that are industry-fixed (e.g., an 
economic boom in certain industries), firm-fixed (e.g., growth, risk, size) or executive-fixed 
(e.g., ownership, risk preference). 
Another concern is that executives within one firm are more alike, on average, than 
executives in different firms, as are firms within one industry. In other words, executives are 
clustered according to firms, and firms are clustered by industries. OLS methodology assumes 
independence among observations. One penalty for ignoring dependence within same clusters 
is that the standard error of the regression coefficient is too low (Hox 2001). 
We employ multilevel modeling to mitigate the aforementioned concerns, allowing for 
firm level- and executive-level fixed effects within the nested data structure and 
simultaneously analyzing each level
16. The fixed effects also address the problem that the 
firm- or executive-level specific factors (such as the quality of corporate governance, 
managerial risk aversion, etc.) influence the results. To test the first- and second hypotheses, 
we construct three-level models, specified as follows:
17 
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16  Severe firm-level and executive-level fixed effects are detected in our sample. More specifically, 61.16% (or 
31.22%) of the total variance in ln(TotWealth) (or ln(TotComp)) can be explained by the variance among 
executives; and the variance at firm-level explains 24.70% (or 19.07%) of the total variance in ln(TotWealth) (or 
ln(TotComp)). 
17  A detailed description of the construction of three-level hierarchical linear models appears in the appendix. We 
use Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimators in our multilevel regression analysis in order to relax the normal error 
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where i, j, k indicate year, executive and company, respectively; 
Compensation_PROXY = TotComp and TotWealth as defined in Section 4.1; 
TSR = dividend-adjusted total shareholder return, as defined in Section 4.1; 
PVSO = a dummy variable indicating the presence of PVSO compensation, as defined in Section 4.2; 
TSO = a dummy variable indicating the presence of TSO compensation, as defined in Section 4.2. 
 
The first hypothesis predicts a closer alignment of owner- and management interests 
with the presence of PVSOs. Thus, we expect  3 β   in equations (1) and (2) to be significantly 
positive. The second hypothesis concerns the comparison between PVSOs and traditional 
stock options (TSOs) in terms of their effects on PPS. It predicts that compared with TSOs, 
PVSOs align owner- and management interests more closely. Thus, we expect  3 β  to be 
greater than 5 β   in equation (2). 
To test the impact of target difficulty on the association between managerial 
compensation and firm performance, we adopt the following model tested only on a subset of 
firms that adopted EPS-based PVSOs: 
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where i, j, k indicate year, executive and company, respectively; 
DIF_PROXY = RELDIF, ABSDIF and DIFF indicating the difficulty level of performance targets 
attached to PVSO compensation, as defined in Section 4.2. 
 
We interpret a negative coefficient  3 β  on the interaction term TSR*DIF_PROXY, as 
providing support for our third hypothesis that difficult targets are associated with lower 
pay-performance sensitivity. 
 
5. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA SOURCES   18
Our initial sample consists of the 350 largest non-financial
18  firms in the UK, based on 
market capitalization at the end of 2004. The reason for focusing on large firms is three-fold. 
First, large firms are of most concern to investors. Second, large firms are more likely to 
reward managers with PVSOs (Conyon et al. 2000a), and usually disclose sufficient 
information, which makes it possible for us to carry out our empirical tests, especially the 
tests of target difficulty. Third, the vast majority of prior studies employ a sample of large 
firms (see Buck et al. 2003, among others). By concentrating on large firms, we are able to 
produce results that are comparable with prior studies. Firms without sufficient information 
on PVSO compensation or without the required financial data are eliminated. We also remove 
executives who worked as a board member only for one year, since compensation in such 
temporary employment may reflect factors other than firm performance improvement. In the 
end, our final sample included 244 firms with 1,383 executive directors from 1999 to 2004. 
Information on managerial compensation was collected from the BoardEx database
19. 
Data on performance targets were obtained directly from the proxy statement of the firm’s 
annual report. Firm financial information was gleaned from Compustat Global industrial and 
commercial files; capital market information was provided by Datastream. 
 
6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Top managers in the UK receive two separate forms of compensation: a direct 
component and deferred rewards. The direct component consists of salary, the annual bonus, 
the pension, and other cash compensation. The deferred rewards generally comprise stocks 
and stock options (e.g. PVSOs and TSOs). 
                                                        
18 The financial sector is excluded from our sample, as prior studies indicate that compensation contracts in these 
firms exhibit idiosyncratic features. 
19  For more details, see www.boardex.com. We randomly select 50 firms and compare their records in BoardEx 
with the firms’ annual reports. We found no substantial difference between the two data sources.   19
Figure 1 shows the level of total wealth, including cash compensation and equity 
holdings (i.e. stock and stock options) of executive directors in our 1999-2004 sample. The 
total wealth series is right-skewed, since the mean value is much higher than the median each 
year, but especially so in 2000. 
Figure 2 depicts the time series of the composition of total executive pay in our sample. 
The cash-based component accounts for less than 35% of the average total compensation 
received by executive directors, and this percentage has declined precipitously since 2002. 
The decline in the importance of the cash component has been accompanied by the increase 
of equity-based components in executive total wealth. In particular, PVSOs have become one 
of the most important elements in executive pay, whereas TSOs have a declining weight. 
PVSOs (measured at their Black-Scholes value (1973)) account for 24.45% of the total equity 
holdings of the executives in the 1999 sample. This percentage is approximately twice as 
much as the proportion of the TSOs’ value in equity compensation in the same year. Since 
then, PVSOs have increased steadily and account for 36.68% of total equity compensation in 
2004; in contrast, the value of TSOs has declined to 3.99% of equity compensation, 
approximately one-tenth of the PVSOs’ value. 
Table 3 reports summary statistics for 4,328 executive director-years, which comprises 
1,234 CEO-years and 3,004 non-CEO executive-years. For both CEOs and non-CEOs, each 
compensation component is skewed positively (e.g., salary, bonus, total cash payment, stock 
options), as is total executive pay. Panels B and C report that, on average, CEO total wealth is 
nearly £19 million within the sample, whereas the corresponding figure for a non-CEO 
executive director is £3 million. Clearly, CEOs are paid more than non-CEOs, and 
equity-based compensation is the main driver for the difference. 
Panels D and E indicate that with PVSOs in compensation packages managers receive   20
more cash
20 (e.g. salary, bonus) in general. Meanwhile, the equity compensation
21 for 
executives with PVSOs in their pay packages is lower than that for executives without PVSOs. 
Firms that grant PVSOs are larger in size and have lower earnings per share relative to those 
without PVSO granted. Panel F summarizes the major components of compensation packages 
for firms with TSOs. Compared to the PVSO (PVSO=1) group, the TSO (TSO=1) group does 
not differ significantly in terms of cash or equity compensation, but firms using TSOs are 
relatively larger in size and have lower leverage. 
Consistent with the prior literature (Conyon et al. 2000), the overwhelming majority of 
firms in our sample attach EPS targets to option vesting (84.45%), while the use of TSR 
performance targets is low (11.17%). 
Table 4 summarizes the statistics for the variables used in the empirical tests. 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Panel A. Skewness in compensation is reduced by taking 
natural logarithms. The mean of the PVSO dummy is 0.660, indicating that about two-thirds 
of the executive-year observations have PVSOs in compensation packages. 
Pearson correlations are presented in Panel B of Table 4. Compensation measures are 
positively correlated with firm performance (i.e. TSR). This suggests that high performance is 
correlated with improvements in executive pay. In Panel B, it is worth noting that the 
presence of an equity-based compensation instrument (i.e. PVSO or TSOs) is associated with 
increases in executive total wealth. Finally, the PVSO dummy is negatively correlated with 
the TSO dummy, which suggests that firms with PVSOs grant fewer TSOs. 
Panels C and D illustrate the Pearson correlations between various compensation 
measures and firm performance (i.e., TSR) for sub-samples grouped by PVSO and TSO, 
respectively. The correlations are greater when PVSO=1 than when PVSO=0: in the presence 
                                                        
20  Both parametric (ANOVA) and nonparametric (Kruskal-Wallis) tests show a significant difference with p<0.01 
in cash compensation between the two groups (PVSO=0/1). 
21 Both parametric (t-test) and nonparametric (Wilcoxon) tests suggest a significant difference, at p<0.01, in 
executive total equity compensation between the two groups (PVSO=0/1).     21
of PVSOs the pay-performance correlation is stronger. The correlations for sub-samples 
grouped by TSO do not appear to follow the same pattern, however. 
 
6.2 Main results 
The following subsections report the empirical results on the three hypotheses. Section 
6.2.1 reports the results of the first two hypotheses, and the discussion focuses on the 
association between PPS and PVSO compensation. Section 6.2.2 evaluates the role of target 
difficulty in the association between PPS and PVSOs. 
6.2.1 PPS and PVSO compensation 
The findings for Model 1 are summarized in Table 5. Two regression equations are 
presented for each of the two measurements of managerial compensation: TotComp and 
TotWealth, which capture the “flow” and “stock” of executive rewards, respectively. 
Chi-square statistics show that both models are significant at p<0.01. The variances of 
0 jk u and  0k v   that capture the executive- and firm-level fixed effects respectively are significant 
at p<0.01, which suggests the efficiency of our multilevel modeling. We measure the model fit by 
performing a chi-square test (χ
2) based on the differences in the -2 LogLikelihood between the 
unrestricted model and the intercept-only model relative to the extra degree of freedom. We find 
significant chi-squares, which suggest an improvement in model fit by adding extra explanatory 
variables. 
For both “flow” and “stock” compensation specifications, the coefficient on the 
interaction between PVSO and TSR is positive, and the null hypothesis β3=0 is rejected at 
p<0.01. The results support our first hypothesis: that the presence of PVSOs in senior 
manager compensation is associated with higher level of pay-performance sensitivity. In 
particular, for the TotComp specification, the coefficient on TSR is 0.214 and is significant at 
p<0.01. The coefficient on the interaction item TSR*PVSO is 0.182, with p-value<0.01. This   22
suggests that, ceteris paribus, for an average executive director with PVSOs in his/her 
compensation package, the sensitivity of total executive rewards to firm performance is 
85.0% [i.e. 0.182/0.214] higher than that of an executive director with no PVSO component. 
Meanwhile, with PVSOs, for a 10% increase in TSR, there is a 4% [i.e., 10*(0.214+0.182)] 
increase in TotComp. For a firm with the median market capitalization value (£664.620 
million) and the median executive compensation of £475,000 in our 1999-2004 sample, 
employing PVSO plans, a 10% improvement in TSR (which produces an additional £66.462 
million shareholder wealth) results in a 4.00% increase in its top managers’ total 
compensation; put differently, in GBP amounts, this means an additional £19,000 increase the 
top managers’ total pay. For the TotWealth specification, the coefficient on the product term 
TSR*PVSO is 0.233 and significant at p<0.01, suggesting that with operating PVSO plans, a 
10% increase in total shareholder returns leads to a 1.67% [i.e., 10*(-0.066+0.233)] increase 
in top managers’ total wealth. 
The results also confirm our second hypothesis. Wald tests show that the coefficient on 
the test variable TSR*PVSO is significantly greater than the coefficient on TSR*TSO, and the 
null hypothesis (i.e. β3<β5) is rejected at a significance level of p<0.01 in both model 
specifications. Specifically, in the specification with TotComp as the dependent variable, the 
presence of TSO compensation increases pay-performance sensitivity by 59.2% [i.e. 
0.119/0.201], while with PVSO the PPS increase is 79.1%. Likewise, in the TotWealth 
specification, for an average executive, a 10% increase in TSR brings about a 0.06% [i.e. 
10*(-0.072+0.078)%] increase in TotWealth when TSOs are included in the compensation 
package, which is much less than the 1.45% [i.e. 10*(-0.072+0.217)%] increase due to 
PVSOs. 
Taken together, a higher pay-performance relation is associated with PVSO 
compensation, consistent with the conjecture that imposing performance conditions on option 
vesting induces higher effort from managers. Thus, by issuing PVSOs to executives,   23
shareholders align managerial welfare with their own wealth to a larger extent; such 
convergence of interests promotes firm performance and shareholder value. 
 
6.2.2 Pay-performance sensitivity and PVSO target difficulty 
The analysis on PVSO target difficulty focuses on the sub-sample of firms that have 
EPS growth targets attached to option vesting. Three proxies measure the difficulty level: 
absolute difficulty level (ABSDIF), difficulty level relative to industry median (RELDIF) and 
ex-post difficulties (DIFF). Table 6 summarizes the empirical results. Chi-square statistics 
show that all models are significant with p-value<0.01. The variances of  0 jk u and  0k v  are 
significant at p<0.01, indicating that after including more explanatory variables the firm- and 
executive-level fixed effects still, to a large extent, explain the total variance of the dependent 
variable. The results of chi-square tests show that the model fit is significant at p<0.01. 
The results vary somewhat with the model specifications. In the TotComp 
specifications, the coefficients on the test variable TSR*DIF_PROXY are negative and 
significant at p<0.01 for the three target difficulty proxies, consistent with the idea that PPS is 
reduced by difficult targets. Thus, the coefficient on TSR*DIFF is -0.497 at p<0.01. This 
result shows that for those managers who miss EPS targets, the pay-performance sensitivity is 
34.2% (i.e. 0.497/1.452) lower than the PPS level for managers achieving vesting targets. 
In the TotWealth specifications, TSR*RELDIF has a negative coefficient, but it is not 
significant at conventional levels. The coefficients on TSR*ABSDIF and TSR*DIFF are 
significantly negative, suggesting that PPS is negatively associated with difficult performance 
targets. The coefficient on TSR is 0.393 with p-value<0.01, and the coefficient on DIFF*TSR 
is -0.081 with a significance level of p<0.05, implying that for those managers missing EPS 
targets, the pay-performance sensitivity is 20.6% (i.e. 0.081/0.393) lower than the PPS level 
for managers achieving performance targets.   24
In summary, the results show that difficult targets negatively affect the PPS level. We 
expect a significant decrease of the pay-performance relation when vesting targets are missed. 
 
7. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
This section performs several tests to examine the robustness of the prior findings. We 
first replicate the analysis using first-differencing models that are not uncommon in 
pay-performance association studies. Untabulated results are generally consistent with our 
prior findings. Specifically, the results fully support H1 and H2, while for H3 the signs are 
consistent with our predictions but not statistically significant. Second, although market-based 
performance provides a direct measure of shareholder wealth, accounting-based performance 
measures (i.e., earnings per share (EPS) and return on assets (ROA)) also were employed in 
prior studies (Conyon et al. 2000b; Zhang et al. 2005). The results (not reported) support our 
prior findings that PVSOs provide managers with greater incentives to perform in line with 
shareholder interests. The results on the role of target difficulty are mixed, however, 
depending on the specification of the target-difficulty measurement. Third, multiple-period 
observations in our sample may result in the problem of observations clustering over time. In 
order to control for the year-fixed effect, we included year dummies into the multilevel 
models and re-performed the analyses. The results are qualitatively the same. 
The descriptive statistics show a large difference between CEO pay and non-CEO pay. 
Prior literature documents that the pay-performance sensitivity of a CEO may be different 
from that of a non-CEO executive director (Conyon and Sadler 2001). CEOs possess greater 
financial incentives than other executives because CEOs are already at the top of the 
organizational hierarchy and have fewer possibilities for further promotion, which to some 
extent can be seen as an alternative form of financial compensation. To test for the 
between-group differences in PPS, we split our sample into a CEO group and a non-CEO 
group and applied the same regression models as in the previous sections within each group.   25
The results (in Tables 7 and 8) support our prior findings, especially for the non-CEO 
sub-sample. For the CEO sub-sample, however, the null hypothesis for H2 (i.e. β3<β5) cannot 
be rejected at the conventional significance level (i.e. with p<0.10). We did not find a large 
PPS disparity between CEOs and non-CEOs. A numerical example illustrates the economic 
significance in terms of PPS between the two groups. For a firm with the median market 
capitalization value (£664.620 million) and the median total CEO compensation (non-CEO) 
of £769,000 (£386,000), compensating top managers with PVSOs, a 10% improvement in 
TSR, which produces an additional £66.462 million shareholder wealth, results in a 4.70% 
(3.68%) increase in its CEO’s (non-CEOs’) total compensation (in GBP amounts, an 
additional £36,143 (£14,205) increase in the CEO’s (non-CEOs’) total compensation). 
Regarding the tests on target difficulty, the interactions between TSR and the target 
difficulty proxies have a negative sign but are not statistically significant in the TotWealth 
specifications in the CEO sample. In contrast, in the TotComp specifications, the coefficients 
on TSR*DIFF-PROXY are in general significantly negative. For the managers missing the 
vesting targets, the pay-performance sensitivity is 48.5% (i.e. 0.652/1.345) lower than the PPS 
level with achievable targets. 
In the non-CEO sample, both signs and significance levels of the interaction 
coefficients are consistent with the prior results in the full sample. Specifically, for a 
non-CEO executive director, the coefficients on the interaction term TSR*DIFF are 
significantly negative at p<0.05 for both compensation specifications, suggesting that the EPS 
targets that are not achieved ex-post are associated with a lower PPS level. Specifically, with 
unachievable targets, the pay-performance sensitivity of non-CEO directors’ TotComp 
(TotWealth) to firm market performance is 29.2% (25.4%) lower than the PPS level with 
achievable performance targets. 
The Black-Scholes stock option fair-value model might contribute with over-estimated 
PVSO value because option vesting probability is strictly smaller than 1. Overvalued option   26
compensation may bias our results upward due to the systematic link between equity 
compensation and firm market prices. To test this restriction in our analyses, we re-perform 
the tests using three different discount rates,
22  partially as implied in prior studies (Conyon et 
al. 2005; Kuang and Suijs 2006). The results show that our prior findings do not depend on 
the valuation assumption. 
We also add lagged performance to our models to control for the fact that executives 
are paid on the basis of previous performance. The empirical results are reported in Tables 9 
and 10. The lagged performance is positively associated with contemporary payment, and this 
significance does not nullify our prior findings. 
Both the natural log transformation on executive compensation measures and the 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimators have already mitigated the influence of extreme 
observations on our empirical results. We further winsorize the dependent variables (i.e., 
TotComp and TotWealth) and independent variable (i.e., TSR) at the 1% and 99% levels. In 
multilevel models, the manipulation serves only to improve the significance level of reported 
results. 
A consensus in the goal-setting literature is there is economic benefit associated with 
increased target difficulty when it is achievable while managers receive de-motivation from 
too difficult targets and lower effort will be exerted (Hirst and Lowy 1990; Covaleski et al. 
2003; Kuang and Suijs 2006). Untabulated results indicate the existent of such an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between PPS and target difficulty in our sample. 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigates the incentive effects of performance-vested stock options in 
aligning shareholder- and management interests. Option vesting conditions would prevent 
                                                        
22 Conyon et al. (2005) use 80% discount rate to capture the vesting probability of performance-based equity 
compensation; Kuang and Suijs (2006) show that the optimal vesting probability for PVSOs is above 72%. 
Furthermore, the sample in the current study indicates a realization probability of 54% for PVSOs.   27
managers from benefiting from effort-irrelevant factors, and our results are supportive of this 
proposition. We find that the presence of a PVSO plan in an executive compensation contract 
is associated with higher pay-for-performance sensitivity, suggesting the convergence of 
owner- and management interests. Results also show that PVSOs outperform TSOs in 
providing managerial incentives. In a sample of firms that have adopted PVSOs we find that 
target difficulty has a negative effect on the PPS. 
This study has examined only how PVSO functions with respect to aligning manager 
and shareholder interests; PVSO may also be used for other purposes, which are beyond the 
scope of this paper. We also recognize that an endogeneity problem may exist in our models. 
For example, firms that choose PVSO compensation differ substantially from those without 
PVSO compensation in aspects such as corporate governance, the structure of managerial 
compensation and market performance. In our multilevel modeling, we control for these firm- 
and executive-level fixed effects simultaneously, thereby mitigating the endogeneity problem 
to a certain extent. Prior studies also show that using fixed effect estimation reduces the 
endogeneity bias and produces consistent results (Nikolaev and van Lent 2005; Verbeek 
2001).  
In addition, this study might suffer from measurement error problems. Firstly, although 
we measure the target difficulty from different angles, they may not fully reflect managerial 
perception of the difficulty in fulfilling the targets. Secondly, the Black-Scholes stock option 
fair-value model might result in overestimated PVSO value. Due to the mechanical 
relationship between equity compensation and firm performance at the market, the 
overestimation may bias our results. However, we believe that the consistent results from the 
tests using discounted PVSO value could to some extent mitigate the overestimation problem. 
The sample consists of the 244 largest UK firms, which limits the generalizability of 
the results. Future research could focus more on small- and medium-sized firms, and explore 
the features regarding incentive compensation in a broader sample. Large firms, however, are   28
of most concern to the stakeholders, and the current study sheds light on the way in which 
PVSO can help to align the interests of managers and shareholders.   29
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Figure 2 
Composition of executive wealth 1999~2004 
 
 
Panel A: Direct payment/Total wealth vs. Equity compensation/Total wealth 
















Panel B: PVSOs/Equity compensation vs. TSOs/Equity compensation 














Direct payment: Salary, bonus, pension and other cash compensation (e.g., relocation and fringe benefits); 
Equity compensation: Estimated value of stock options (the Black-Scholes value) and stocks; 




Variable Name     Description 
Dependent variables:    
TotComp  
Salary, bonus, pension, other cash compensation (e.g. 
relocation and fringe benefits), plus the changes in 
unrealized value of stocks of executives’ wealth (i.e. the 
summation of changes in the Black-Scholes value of 
stock options, changes in the value of stocks of 
executives’ equity, and changes in estimated value of 
restricted stocks) 
TotWealth   Cash compensation plus estimated value of stock options 
and share holdings 
Independent variables:    
TSR   Total shareholder return (including dividends) in current 
year 
PVSO   A dummy variable indicating the presence of PVSOs in 
executive compensation (1=yes; 0=no) 
TSO   A dummy variable indicating the presence of TSOs in 
executive compensation (1=yes; 0=no) 
RELDIF  
Difference between a firm’s EPS vesting condition and 
the average EPS vesting condition for the industry to
which the firm belongs. 
ABSDIF    Absolute value of a firm’s EPS vesting condition 
DIFF   A dummy variable, equal to zero if the EPS target is 
achieved in year t; one otherwise. 
Others:    
DirectComp   Salary, bonus, pension and other cash compensation (e.g. 
relocation and fringe benefits); 
TotEquity   Estimated value of stock options (Black-Scholes value) 
and stocks 
ValuePVSOs    Black-Scholes value of PVSOs 
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Variable Name     Description 
ValueTSOs    Black-Scholes value of TSOs 
Ln(MV)    Natural logarithm of market value 
Ln(Total Assets)    Natural logarithm of book value of total assets 
MtB    Ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity 
EPS   Earnings  per  share 
ROA    Return on total assets 
Leverage    Total debt ratio 
   37
Table 2 
Summary of sample selection process 
 
Top 350 (by market capitalization) non-financial firms in 2004    350   
Less:  Delisted  firms  afterwards    43 
            Firms without sufficient information to make the distinction 
  between  PVSOs  and  TSOs   9 
      Firms  with  incomplete  financial  information    54 
Total:  Firms  included    244 
      #  of  executives    1,569 
Less:    Executives functioning for less than two years    186 
Total:  Executives  included    1,383 
      #  of  observations  as  executive-years    4,328   38
Table 3 
Summary of executive compensation and firm characteristics 
 (4,238  executive-years) 
 
 
   
Mean  Std. 
Dev.  1% 25%  Median  75%  99% 
Panel A: Total executive directors (N=4,238) 
Salary 271  165  30  165  237  332  816 
Bonus 125  204  0  12  71  150  959 
DirectComp 451  368  48  239  360  546  1,954 
ValuePVSOs 540  1,632  0  0  172  583  5,023 
ValueTSOs 217  3,273  0  0  0  6  3,257 
TotEquity 7,131  39,661  0  377  987  2,622  131,727
TotWealth 7,582  39,691  161  690  1,429  3,218  132,307
Ln(MV) 6.709  1.471  4.297  5.535  6.499  7.672  10.266
Ln(Total Assets)  6.878  1.581  3.791  5.625  6.807  8.000  10.332
MtB 4.162  16.894  0.325  1.282  1.983  3.270  28.876
TSR 0.160  0.831  -0.705 -0.152 0.090  0.352  1.667 
EPS (penny per share)  26.202  59.084 -92.227 6.345 18.397  36.175  263.425
ROA 0.037  0.152  -0.571 0.026  0.050  0.085  0.203 
Leverage  0.571  0.175  0.096 0.458  0.579  0.689 0.958 
             
Panel B: CEOs (N=1,234) 
Salary 371  191  61  247  325  454  968 
Bonus 184  292  0  1  108  225  1,534 
DirectComp 634  501  72  341  508  757  2,771 
ValuePVSOs 903  2,749  0  0  287  883  9,355 
ValueTSOs 525  6,017  0  0  0  8  9,982 
TotEquity 18,233  69,791  0  824  2,365  6,757  402,814
TotWealth 18,867  69,801  279  1,378  3,047  7,483  403,385
Ln(MV) 6.650  1.481  4.260  5.487  6.413  7.519  11.224
Ln(Total Assets)  6.786  1.592  3.715  5.569  6.682  7.832  10.517
MtB 3.934  14.127  0.441  1.285  2.006  3.386  27.719
TSR 0.179  0.815  -0.719 -0.137 0.102  0.378  1.674 
EPS (penny per share)  25.639  60.053 -89.940 6.177 18.091  35.549  298.382
ROA 0.041  0.133  -0.434 0.026  0.050  0.086  0.234 
Leverage  0.566  0.176  0.085 0.456  0.575  0.689 0.949 
               39
   Mean  Std. 
Dev.  1% 25%  Median  75%  99% 
Panel C: Non-CEO executive directors (N=3,004) 
Salary 230  132  28  150  209  288  600 
Bonus 100  148  0  12  62  121  761 
DirectComp 376  262  40  215  312  461  1,287 
ValuePVSOs 391  761  0  0  145  479  3,355 
ValueTSOs 90  450  0  0  0  6  1,655 
TotEquity 2,571  12,164  0  300  737  1,687  34,428
TotWealth 2,947  12,183  151  573  1,103  2,190  34,654
Ln(MV) 6.733  1.466  4.299  5.562  6.545  7.734  10.192
Ln(Total Assets)  6.915  1.574  3.855  5.643  6.935  8.081  10.253
MtB 4.256  17.906  0.325  1.281  1.980  3.236  30.427
TSR 0.153  0.838  -0.707 -0.161 0.085  0.348  1.668 
EPS (penny per share)  26.434  58.690 -92.751 6.468 18.785  36.327  263.425
ROA 0.035  0.159  -0.598 0.026  0.050  0.084  0.195 
Leverage 0.573  0.175  0.112  0.460  0.580  0.690  0.966 
             
Panel D: Executive directors with PVSO plans, PVSO=1(N=2,810) 
Salary 286  172  68  177  250  350  823 
Bonus 129  202  0  18  78  159  849 
DirectComp 474  368  100  254  384  573  1,963 
ValuePVSOs 815  1,948  13  176  409  845  6,460 
ValueTSOs 109  747  0  0  0  0  2,316 
TotEquity 4,507  32,234  51  461  1,024  2,423  62,107
TotWealth 4,981  32,265  220  785  1,466  3,009  62,654
Ln(MV)  6.734  1.386  4.371 5.626  6.551  7.642 9.892 
Ln(Total Assets)  6.936  1.474  4.018  5.850  6.932  7.970  10.089
MtB 3.405  5.984  0.316  1.272  1.973  3.138  26.598
TSR 0.152  0.881  -0.684 -0.161 0.092  0.352  1.574 
EPS (penny per share)  23.716  53.079 -77.704 5.509 15.577  33.907  303.731
ROA 0.035  0.131  -0.442 0.025  0.047  0.076  0.188 
Leverage  0.572  0.181  0.095 0.457  0.580  0.694 0.959 
  
Panel E: Executive directors without PVSO plans, PVSO=0 (N=1,428) 
Salary 242  145  0  150  210  299  759 
Bonus 116  208  0  0  59  127  1,182 
DirectComp 406  364  4  208  313  484  1,920 
ValuePVSOs  0  0  0 0  0  0 0   40
   Mean  Std. 
Dev.  1% 25%  Median  75%  99% 
ValueTSOs 428  5,535  0  0  0  26  4,712 
TotEquity 12,295  50,842  0  234  859  3,316  272,278
TotWealth 12,701  50,881  59  513  1,248  3,875  273,117
Ln(MV) 6.660  1.624  4.272  5.337  6.357  7.809  11.602
Ln(Total Assets)  6.762  1.767  3.685  5.227  6.665  8.153  11.877
MtB 5.661  27.862  0.325  1.325  1.995  3.520  74.403
TSR 0.176  0.723  -0.771 -0.130 0.087  0.365  1.718 
EPS (penny per share)  31.122  69.211  -184.348 8.430  24.078  42.318  186.118
ROA 0.041  0.187  -1.538 0.029  0.057  0.093  0.245 
Leverage  0.569  0.165  0.193 0.461  0.577  0.672 0.960 
             
Panel F: Executive directors with TSO plans, TSO=1 (N=1,207) 
Salary 299  211  52  171  257  365  952 
Bonus 132  232  0  5  70  150  1,161 
DirectComp 483  419  75  242  390  566  2,227 
ValuePVSOs 441  1,047  0  0  105  491  4,179 
ValueTSOs 761  6,105  1  15  74  399  10,649
TotEquity 5,428  32,053  50  511  1,180  2,966  93,338
TotWealth 5,911  32,108  207  831  1,609  3,564  95,691
Ln(MV) 7.084  1.643  4.299  5.654  7.023  8.317  11.602
Ln(Total Assets)  7.201  1.736  3.574  5.877  7.262  8.459  11.976
MtB 3.278  4.859  0.325  1.339  1.927  3.378  26.550
TSR 0.136  0.774  -0.771 -0.180 0.037  0.365  1.817 
EPS (penny per share)  22.682  55.543 -198.841 6.624  17.803 36.319  303.731
ROA 0.025  0.203  -1.631 0.027  0.053  0.083  0.195 
Leverage  0.553  0.175  0.085 0.443  0.574  0.676 0.906 
             
Panel G: Executive directors without TSO plans, TSO=0 (N=3,031) 
Salary 260  140  28  163  230  321  759 
Bonus 122  192  0  15  71  150  901 
DirectComp 438  345  33  238  348  534  1,763 
ValuePVSOs 580  1,812  0  0  197  607  5,116 
ValueTSOs  0  0  0 0  0  0 0 
TotEquity 7,810  42,297  0  339  900  2,452  142,954
TotWealth 8,248  42,321  153  636  133  3,054  143,152
Ln(MV)  6.559  1.368  4.276 5.509  6.349  7.368 9.709 
Ln(Total Assets)  6.749  1.495  3.857  5.545  6.664  7.770  10.155  41
   Mean  Std. 
Dev.  1% 25%  Median  75%  99% 
MtB 4.515  19.731  0.327  1.267  2.003  3.201  29.610
TSR 0.170  0.853  -0.682 -0.144 0.103  0.352  1.617 
EPS (penny per share)  27.605  60.388 -66.445 6.148 18.787  36.130  263.425
ROA 0.042  0.126  -0.441 0.026  0.050  0.086  0.215 
Leverage  0.578  0.175  0.099 0.456  0.580  0.691 0.973 
             
Panel H: PVSO plans with EPS target, EPS=1 (N=2,373) 
Salary 287  157  79  180  251  351  837 
Bonus 127  193  0  16  77  158  821 
DirectComp 474  353  104  254  386  576  1,932 
ValuePVSOs 832  2,079  13  173  400  833  6,867 
ValueTSOs 94  730  0  0  0  0  2,131 
TotEquity 4,769  34,931  51  445  993  2,346  75,172
TotWealth 5,243  34,962  215  765  1,442  2,944  75,487
Ln(MV)  6.798  1.380  4.421 5.724  6.608  7.696 9.896 
Ln(Total  Assets)  6.989  1.426  4.069 5.955  6.975  7.987 9.851 
MtB 3.411  6.236  0.532  1.301  2.023  3.068  27.167
TSR 0.120  0.453  -0.697 -0.161 0.083  0.351  1.509 
EPS (penny per share)  24.564  51.299 -59.746 6.020 15.795  33.968  310.269
ROA 0.037  0.130  -0.479 0.027  0.047  0.075  0.191 
Leverage  0.576  0.175  0.096 0.462  0.580  0.691 0.965 
 
Panel I: PVSO plans without EPS target, EPS=0 (N=437) 
Salary 279  239  50  170  250  340  775 
Bonus 140  244  0  25  79  171  1,129 
DirectComp 478  441  50  249  374  565  2,209 
ValuePVSOs 722  954  7  187  449  891  5,901 
ValueTSOs 187  831  0  0  0  26  4,991 
TotEquity 3,083  7,308  56  540  1,133  2,854  28,000
TotWealth 3,560  7,379  284  909  1,599  3,403  28,341
Ln(MV)  6.375  1.367  4.221 5.195  6.130  7.306 9.683 
Ln(Total Assets)  6.640  1.687  3.946  5.137  6.381  7.735  10.248
MtB 3.374  4.338  0.168  1.111  1.512  4.300  25.540
TSR 0.332  1.978  -0.666 -0.168 0.150  0.396  14.826
EPS (penny per share)  19.024  61.876 -224.396 2.433  13.949 31.930  224.957
ROA 0.023  0.136  -0.709 0.009  0.046  0.092  0.166 
Leverage  0.552  0.210  0.055 0.413  0.577  0.702 0.948   42
   Mean  Std. 
Dev.  1% 25%  Median  75%  99% 
Panel J: PVSO plans with TSR target, TSR=1 (N=314) 
Salary 328  269  76  208  293  381  881 
Bonus 145  252  0  23  97  176  975 
DirectComp 539  453  118  313  459  646  2,187 
ValuePVSOs 810  1,377  20  184  421  769  7,075 
ValueTSOs 232  965  0  0  0  26  5,257 
TotEquity 14,089  89,473  49  444  1,040  2,754  667,443
TotWealth 14,628  89,496  291  848  1,602  3,596  667,961
Ln(MV)  6.603  1.156  4.777 5.724  6.649  7.310 9.635 
Ln(Total Assets)  7.210  1.300  4.819  6.278  7.239  7.820  10.248
MtB 2.542  3.593  0.313  0.839  1.205  2.245  24.801
TSR 0.069  0.471  -0.684 -0.246 0.064  0.277  1.646 
EPS (penny per share)  34.098  105.638  -218.415 -0.635 7.981  30.977  555.164
ROA 0.013  0.100  -0.373 -0.003 0.028  0.059  0.205 
Leverage  0.572  0.240  0.052 0.441  0.587  0.770 0.926 
             
Panel K: PVSO plans without TSR target, TSR=0 (N=2,496) 
Salary 281  155  65  174  248  348  822 
Bonus 127  195  0  17  75  155  832 
DirectComp 466  355  99  248  374  564  1,949 
ValuePVSOs 816  2,009  12  174  409  871  6,339 
ValueTSOs 93  714  0  0  0  0  1,800 
TotEquity 3,302  12,348  51  465  1,023  2,371  54,105
TotWealth 3,768  12,411  216  782  1,459  2,978  57,519
Ln(MV)  6.750  1.412  4.266 5.614  6.528  7.678 9.892 
Ln(Total Assets)  6.901  1.491  3,983  5.722  6.880  7.986  10.060
MtB 3.514  6.213  0.316  1.334  2.057  3.155  28.118
TSR 0.163  0.919  -0.697 -0.145 0.098  0.359  1.517 
EPS (penny per share)  22.404  41.851 -76.454 6.342 16.667  34.068  179.957
ROA 0.038  0.134  -0.571 0.027  0.050  0.080  0.189 
Leverage  0.572  0.172  0.107 0.459  0.579  0.690 0.965 
 
Notes: 




Panel A: Descriptive statistics for regression variables 
Variables  Mean  Std.  Dev. 1%  25% Median 75%  99% 
ln(TotComp)  13.363 1.267 10.210  12.608  13.295  14.040  17.130 
ln(TotWealth)  14.334 1.325 12.000  13.444  14.173  14.986  18.701 
TSR  0.160   0.831   -0.705  -0.152  0.090   0.352   1.667  
PVSO  0.660  0.473  0 0 1 1 1 
TSO  0.280  0.451  0 0 0 1 1 
ABSDIF  3.273 1.657 1.207 2.330 3.000 3.387  10.000 
RELDIF  -0.032 1.590 -2.351 -0.793 -0.180 0.153 6.466 
DIFF  0.457  0.498  0 0 0 1 1 
 
Panel B: Pearson correlation coefficients 
   TSR  PVSO  TSO 
ln(TotComp) 0.247*** -0.021  0.031 
ln(TotWealth)  0.087*** -0.017 0.045*** 
TSR 1  -0.014  -0.019 
PVSO     1  -0.105*** 
TSO     1 
 
Panel C: Pearson correlation coefficients: by PVSO 
    TSR (PVSO=1)  TSR (PVSO=0) 
ln(TotComp) 0.278***  0.196*** 
ln(TotWealth) 0.121***  0.044 
 
 
Panel D: Pearson correlation coefficients: by TSO 
    TSR (TSO=1)  TSR (TSO=0) 
ln(TotComp) 0.275***  0.239*** 
ln(TotWealth) 0.105***  0.082*** 
 
Notes: 
***: significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); 
Variables are as defined in Table 1. 
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Table 5 
Multilevel models examining the efficiency of PVSOs vs. TSOs (full sample) 
 
Model (1) 
01 2 3 ln( _ ) * ijk ijk ik ijk ik ijk Compensation PROXY TSR PVSO TSR PVSO β ββ β =+ + +
00 0 0 0 0 0 ijk k jk ijk vu e β γ =+ ++ 
Model (2) 
01 2 3 4
5
ln( _ ) *
*
ijk ijk ik ijk ik ijk ijk
ik ijk
Compensation PROXY TSR PVSO TSR PVSO TSO
TSR TSO
β ββ β β
β
=+ + + +
+
00 0 0 0 0 0 ijk k jk ijk vu e β γ =+ ++ 
 
Panel A: Estimated coefficients for Model 1 and Model 2 
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Model fit         
Approximate likelihood ratio 
-2*loglikelihood (deviance
23) 
10,456 10,449 9,523  9,503 




25 325*** 313*** 333*** 
N  3,501  3,501 4,216 4,216 
 
 
Panel B: Summary of tests for H1 and H2 
 ln(TotComp)  ln(TotWealth) 
H1               








        
H2        
Null hypothesis: β3<β5   Rejected at 




Standard errors are in parentheses; 
*: significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed); 
**: significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); 
***: significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
#: significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed); 
##: significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed); 
###: significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
 
                                                        
23  The Maximum Likelihood procedure also produces a statistic called the deviance, which indicates how well the 
model fits the data. In general, models with a lower deviance fit better than models with a higher deviance (Hox 
2001). 
24  The intercept-only model is useful as a null-model that serves as a benchmark to which other models are 
compared. The deviances of the two models can be used to compare their fit statistically. 
25  For nested models, the difference in deviance has a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the 
difference in the number of parameters that are estimated in the two models (three degrees of freedom in the 
current case).  
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Table 6 
Multilevel models examining the role of vesting target difficulty 
 
Model (3) 
01 2 3 ln( _ ) _ * _ ijk ijkl ik ik ik ik Compensation PROXY TSR DIF PROXY TSR DIF PROXY β ββ β =+ + +  
0 000 0 0 0 ijk k jk ijk vu e β γ =+ ++ 
 
 ln(TotComp)  ln(TotWealth) 
























ABSDIF (β2)  0.077*** 
(0.024)     0.007 
(0.012)    
TSR* ABSDIF (β3)  -0.120### 
(0.027)     -0.013# 
(0.010)    
RELDIF (β2)   
 
0.084*** 
(0.025)     
 
0.007 
(0.012)   
TSR* RELDIF (β3)   
 
-0.119### 
(0.028)     
 
-0.012 
(0.011)   
DIFF     0.102** 
(0.049)     -0.042** 
(0.020) 
TSR* DIFF   
(β3)     -0.497### 
(0.106)     -0.081## 
(0.043) 


























Model  fit        
-2*loglikelihood 
(deviance)  5,031 5,033 4,524 4,017 4,017 3,618 
Deviances difference  5,743***  5,741***  6,250*** 5,819*** 5,819*** 6,218*** 
N  1,908 1,908 1,708 2,300 2,300 2,055 
 
Notes: 
Standard errors are in parentheses; 
*: significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed); 
**: significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); 
***: significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
#: significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed); 
##: significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed); 
###: significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
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Table 7 
Multilevel models with CEO sample 
 
Panel A: Multilevel models examining the efficiency of PVSOs vs. TSOs 
 ln(TotComp)  ln(TotWealth) 
































TSO (β4)   -0.299*** 
(0.109)    -0.024 
(0.062) 
TSR*TSO (β5)     0.716### 
(0.133)    0.275### 
(0.062) 


















Model fit      
Approximate likelihood ratio 
-2*loglikelihood (deviance) 
3,135 3,105 2,945 2,925 
Difference from intercept-only 
model likelihood ratio  82*** 112*** 85*** 105*** 
N 981  981  1,228  1,228 
 
 
Panel B: Summary of tests for H1 and H2 
   ln(TotComp)  ln(TotWealth) 
H1        
Null hypothesis: β3=0  Rejected at p<0.01 Rejected at p<0.01 Rejected at p<0.01  Rejected at p<0.01
      
H2      





Panel C: Multilevel models examining the role of vesting target difficulty 
 ln(TotComp)  ln(TotWealth) 
























ABSDIF (β2)  0.031 
(0.038)     0.016 




(0.051)     -0.014 
(0.017)    
RELDIF (β2)   
 
0.041 
(0.039)     
 
0.015 






(0.055)     
 
-0.011 
(0.018)   
DIFF     0.243** 
(0.095)     -0.039 
(0.037) 
TSR* DIFF   
(β3)     -0.652### 
(0.185)     -0.032 
(0.074) 
Variance of 



























Model fit        
-2*loglikelihood 
(deviance)  1,428 1,428 1,302 1,157 1,157 1,068 
Deviances 
difference  1,789*** 1,789*** 1,915*** 1,874*** 1,874*** 1,963*** 
N  514 514 466 639 639 575 
 
Notes: 
Standard errors are in parentheses; 
*: significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed); 
**: significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); 
***: significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
#: significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed); 
##: significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed); 
###: significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).  
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Table 8 
Multilevel models with non-CEO sample 
 
Panel A: Multilevel models examining the efficiency of PVSOs vs. TSOs 
 ln(TotComp)  ln(TotWealth) 
































TSO (β4)   -0.013 
(0.057)    0.114*** 
(0.036) 
TSR*TSO (β5)   0.064# 
(0.047)    0.036# 
(0.024) 


















Model fit      
Approximate likelihood ratio 
-2*loglikelihood (deviance) 
6,956 6,954 6,164 6,151 
Difference from intercept-only 
model likelihood ratio  246*** 248*** 227*** 240*** 
N  2,520 2,520 2,988 2,988 
 
 
Panel B: Summary of tests for H1 and H2 
   ln(TotComp)  ln(TotWealth) 
H1        
Null hypothesis: β3=0  Rejected at p<0.01 Rejected at p<0.01 Rejected at p<0.01  Rejected at p<0.01
      
H2      
Null hypothesis: β3<β5    Rejected at p<0.01   Rejected at p<0.01
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Panel C: Multilevel models examining the role of vesting target difficulty 
 ln(TotComp)  ln(TotWealth) 
























ABSDIF (β2)  0.077*** 
(0.025)     0.000 




(0.030)     -0.011 
(0.013)    
RELDIF (β2)   
 
0.085*** 
(0.026)     
 
0.000 






(0.031)     
 
-0.013 
(0.013)   
DIFF     0.039 
(0.054)     -0.042* 
(0.024) 
TSR* DIFF   
(β3)     -0.399### 
(0.123)     -0.103## 
(0.052) 
Variance of 



























Model fit        
-2*loglikelihood 
(deviance)  3,441 3,441 3,060 2,687 2,687 2,337 
Deviances 
difference  3,761*** 3,761*** 4,142*** 3,705*** 3,705*** 4,055*** 
N  1,394 1,394 1,242 1,661 1,661 1,480 
 
Notes: 
Standard errors are in parentheses; 
*: significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed); 
**: significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); 
***: significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
#: significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed); 
##: significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed); 




Multilevel models examining the efficiency of PVSOs vs. TSOs   
(incl. lagged performance) 
 
Model (1) 
01 2 3 4, 1 ln( _ ) * ijk ijk ik ijk ik ijk ik t Compensation PROXY TSR PVSO EPS PVSO TSR β ββ β β − =+ + + +
00 0 0 0 0 0 ijk k jk ijk vu e β γ =+ ++ 
Model (2) 
01 2 3 4
56 , 1
ln( _ ) *
*
ijk ijk ik ijk ik ijk ijk
ik ijk ik t
Compensation PROXY TSR PVSO TSR PVSO TSO
TSR TSO TSR
β ββ β β
ββ −
=+ + + +
++
00 0 0 0 0 0 ijk k jk ijk vu e β γ =+ ++ 
 
Panel A: Estimated coefficients for Model 1 and Model 2 











































































Model fit        
Approximate likelihood ratio 
-2*loglikelihood (deviance
26) 
8,074 8,074 7,474 7,466 
Difference from intercept-only 
model likelihood ratio
27 
2,700*** 2,700*** 2,362*** 2,370*** 
N  2,892 2,892 3,461 3,461 
 
 
Panel B: Summary of tests for H1 and H2 
 ln(TotComp)  ln(TotWealth) 
H1               








        
H2        
Null hypothesis: β3<β5   Rejected at 




Standard errors are in parentheses; 
*: significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed); 
**: significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); 
***: significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
#: significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed); 
##: significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed); 
###: significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
                                                        
26  The Maximum Likelihood procedure also produces a statistic called the deviance, which indicates how well the 
model fits the data. In general, models with a lower deviance fit better than models with a higher deviance (Hox 
2001). 
27  The intercept-only model is useful as a null-model that serves as a benchmark with which other models are 
compared. The deviances of the two models can be used to compare their fit statistically.  
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Table 10 
Multilevel models examining the role of vesting target difficulty   
(incl. lagged performance) 
 
Model (3) 
01 2 3 4 , 1 ln( _ ) _ * _ ijk ijkl ik ik ik ik ik t Compensation PROXY TSR DIF PROXY TSR DIF PROXY TSR β ββ β β − =+ + + +           
0 000 0 0 0 ijk k jk ijk vu e β γ =+ ++ 
 ln(TotComp)  ln(TotWealth) 
























ABSDIF (β2)  0.063** 
(0.028)     0.015 
(0.012)    
TSR* ABSDIF (β3)  -0.091### 
(0.029)     -0.013# 
(0.009)    
RELDIF (β2)   
 
0.066** 
(0.029)     
 
0.012 
(0.013)   
TSR* RELDIF (β3)   
 
-0.077###
(0.031)     
 
-0.007 
(0.010)   
DIFF     0.097* 
(0.050)     0.015 
(0.019) 
TSR* DIFF   
(β3)     -0.491###
(0.108)     -0.146### 
(0.038) 






































Model  fit        
-2*loglikelihood 
(deviance)  4,214 4,216 4,204 3,143 3,143 3,131 
Deviances difference  6,560***  6,558***  6,570*** 6,693*** 6,694*** 6,705*** 
N  1,611 1,611 1,611 1,936 1,936 1,936 
 
Notes: 
Standard errors are in parentheses; 
*: significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed); 
**: significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); 
***: significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
#: significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed); 
##: significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed); 
###: significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).  
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Appendix: Construct of three-level hierarchical linear model 
 
In an attempt to justify the appropriate number of levels within the hierarchical structure of 













~ (0, ): 0.020(0.048)
~ (0, ): 0.419(0.072)
~ (0, ): 1.044(0.047)
~ (0, ): 0.240(0.007)
ijkl ijkl














=+ + + +
ΩΩ =
ΩΩ =
⎡⎤ ΩΩ = ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ΩΩ = ⎣⎦
 
where  l   stands for industry,  k  for  firms,  j   for executives and  i   for executive years. 
The average values on the dependent variable (e.g., executive total wealth) vary with 
groups at each level within the hierarchical structure. Instead of incorporating a number of 
indicators for these groups (i.e., industry, firm, or executive dummies) into the model, a multilevel 
model captures group fixed effects by assigning a random intercept that consists of several 
components, one for each level. Specifically in our models, 0l f ,  0kl v  and  0 jkl u  control for the 
group fixed effects at the level of industry, firm, and individual executive, respectively. As a 
consequence, the residual term is now partitioned into four components corresponding to each 
level in the hierarchy.  0ijkl e  stands for the residual at the lowest level (i); 
0 jkl u ,  0kl v , and  0l f  
control for executive-, firm-, and industry fixed effects, respectively. The residual variance also 
comprises four components: f Ω ,  v Ω ,  u Ω , and  e Ω   for variance among industries, firms, 
executive, and lowest level (executive-years), respectively. The similarity among observations in 
the same level is measured by the intra-class correlation, which measures the extent to which the 
value of the dependent variable (e.g., CEO total wealth) of observations within the same group 
compares with the value of observations from other groups. Put differently, intra-class correlation 
refers to the proportion of the total residual variation that is due to the difference between groups 












+++ + + +
 
Likewise, we calculate  v ρ  and f ρ . Approximately 60.59% (24.32% and 1.16%) of the 
total variance in  ln( ) TotWealth  can be attributed to differences among executives (firms and 
industries). Industry groups appear to explain only a small proportion of the total variance. 
Meanwhile,  f Ω , i.e.,
2
f σ , is not significant (Z=0.020/0.048)
28. We therefore compare the full 
model with a restricted model that excludes 0l f . The value of the likelihood ratio statistic also 
cannot reject H0:  f Ω =0. For a robustness check, we employ executive total 
compensationln( ) TotComp as the dependent variable in the intercept-only model. The results 
confirm the use of three levels: firm, executive and executive-year. Thus, we finally construct 
three-level models specified as follows: 
01 2 3
45
ln( _ ) *
*
ijk ijk ik ijk ik ijk
ijk ik ijk






             




~( 0 , )












Again, we calculate  u ρ  and  v ρ   in the intercept-only model with three levels. 
Approximately 61.16% and 24.70% of the total variance in  ln( ) TotWealth
29 can be explained 
by the variance among executives and firms, respectively.   
                                                        
28 In the current study, the estimators in both first-order differencing and multilevel regression analyses are 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimators. Maximum Likelihood estimation includes procedures to generate standard 
errors for most of the parameter estimates. These can be used in significance testing, by computing the test statistic 
Z: Z-parameter/st. error. 
29  31.22% and 19.07% of the total variance in ln(TotComp) can be attributed to the differences among executives 
and firms, respectively. 